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About the Working Paper Series 
This article is one in a series of papers addressing one or more issues of 
critical importance to the acquisition profession.  A working paper is a forum to 
accomplish a variety of objectives, such as: (1) present a rough draft of a particular 
piece of acquisition research, (2) structure a “white paper” to present opinion or 
reasoning, (3) put down one’s thoughts in a “think piece” for collegial review, (4) 
present a preliminary draft of an eventual article in an acquisition periodical, (5) 
provide a tutorial (such as a technical note) to accompany a case study, and (6) 
develop a dialogue among practitioners and researchers that encourages debate 
and discussion on topics of mutual importance.   A working paper is generally the 
“internal” outlet for academic and research institutions to cultivate an idea, argument 
or hypothesis, particularly when in its infant stages.  The primary intent is to induce 
critical thinking about crucial acquisition issues/problems that will become part of the 
acquisition professional body of knowledge.  
It is expected that articles in the working paper series will eventually be 
published in other venues, such as in refereed journals and other periodicals, as 
technical reports, as chapters in a book, as cases or case studies, as monographs, 
or as a variety of other similar publications. 
Readers are encouraged to provide both written and oral feedback to working 
paper authors.  Through rigorous discussion and discourse, it is anticipated that 
underlying assumptions, concepts, conventional wisdom, theories and principles will 



















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - iii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
About the Authors 
Tom Housel specializes in valuing intellectual capital and knowledge value 
measurement. He is currently a tenured Full Professor for the Information Sciences 
(Systems) Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He 
won the prestigious Society for Information Management award for Best Paper in the 
Field in 1986. His work on measuring the value of intellectual capital has been 
featured in a Fortune cover story (October 3, 1994), Investor’s Business Daily, 
numerous books, professional periodicals, and academic journals (most recently in 
the Journal of Intellectual Capital, 2, 2005). 
Thomas Housel 
Professor 
Graduate School of Operational and Informational Sciences 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Tel: (831) 656-7657 
E-mail: tjhousel@nps.edu 
Valery Kanevsky is a world-class mathematician and Complexity theorist. He 
is currently a research scientist with Pay-By-Touch in San Francisco.  He is the 
coauthor of the knowledge value added (KVA) methodology and winner of numerous 
awards for his research. 
Valery Kanevsky 
Professor 
Graduate School of Operational and Informational Sciences 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
Tel: 831-656-7657 
Fax: (831) 656-3679 

































Measuring the Value Added of Management:  
A Knowledge Value Added Approach 
31 December 2006 
by 
Dr. Thomas J. Housel, Professor, and  
Dr. Valery Kanevsky, Research Professor 
 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - vii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table of Contents 
Introduction ..............................................................................................1 
Objectivity Needed .............................................................................2 
Research Focus .................................................................................2 
Management “Dark Matter” ................................................................3 
Difficult-to-track Dark Matter Outputs .................................................5 
Computing Metaphor..........................................................................6 
Dark Matter Correlates with Market Performance ..............................8 
Outputs of Dark Matter.......................................................................9 
Operationalizing: The Measurement of Dark Matter ...........................11 
Management Dark Matter Outputs and Job Descriptions.................12 
Case Example: Ship Tracking Process ................................................14 
Ship Tracking Management’s Dark Matter Activities ........................15 
Standard KVA and Delta Correlation Approaches............................17 
Basic Hypothesis..............................................................................19 
Hypothesis Test: ARCI versus Proprietary Acquisition.....................19 
ROI on Management Dark Matter ....................................................21 
Prior Approaches to Assessing the Value of Management................23 
Corporate Management/Governance Value.....................................23 
Increasing the Value of Corporate Management..............................26 
Lessons from Fund Management Research ....................................29 
Knowledge-based Approaches ........................................................30 
Options and Dark Matter ..................................................................33 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - viii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References ..................................................................................35 
Appendix A. Future Research—The Delta Problem ............................37 
Appendix B. Correlating the Delta in Value and Management 
Dark Matter Activity ...............................................................................39 
Appendix C. Observations about Over-estimates of Dark 
Matter ......................................................................................................41 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 1- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Introduction 
That management adds value to organizations is one of the unquestioned 
truisms of business, government, military, and any other multi-member organization. 
The question left largely unanswered is, “How much value does management add to 
an organization?”  The central research focus of this study is to establish a method 
for objectively measuring the value management adds to an organization.   
Determining the value added by management becomes particularly important 
as Navy acquisition managers deal with increasingly complex, open business 
models that engage many more participants in the development and implementation 
of products and services to support warfighters. There is a recognition that 
emerging, increasingly complex acquisition environments require more direction, 
collaboration, and control to achieve the reductions in costs as well as the increases 
in warfighting effectiveness that initiatives, such as the Open Architecture (OA) 
system acquisition and development framework, promise. The increasing burden on 
management in such environments largely derives from the amount of complexity 
managers must deal with by attempting to mitigate risks, improve predictions, and 
exercise the control and oversight necessary to be successful. 
Determining the value added by management is important because: 
 Managers need to know how well they are performing in more complex 
and demanding environments such as OA and open business models. 
 Those who evaluate management performance need a common metric 
to gauge the degree to which managers are succeeding or failing. 
 Poor performance by management threatens delivery time, acquisition 
costs, and capability of acquired products and services. 
 A consistent and objective way to evaluate management provides 
historical performance data that leads to more precise risk estimates 
(instead of uncertainty-based guesses).  
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 Including management performance in the overall assessment of 
organizational performance provides a more complete picture of how 
well an organization is performing. 
Objectivity Needed 
Solving this problem requires a new and more objective approach to 
measuring the value added by management than previous efforts. Subjective 
approaches and approaches based on corporate-level residuals—which presumably 
are a result of management activity—will not provide the kinds of precision 
necessary to allocate value (e.g., revenue, outputs) to individual managers in 
proportion to the amount they contribute to the organization’s value stream.  
Management literature is replete with the characteristics, motivations, and 
general mantras regarding what it takes to develop and sustain great managers. 
There are even more articles, books, motivational tapes and videos on what it takes 
to become a great leader. Undoubtedly, these suggestions can lead to great 
management. However, without a way to partition the actual, countable contributions 
that management makes to the corporate bottom line or general organizational 
success, there will be no way to tell which suggestions really work and which add 
little or no marginal value.   
Research Focus 
This research will focus on making the case for a method to objectively 
measure the value added by management activities. We will review the general 
issues involved in developing a theoretically sound, rigorous, and pragmatic 
approach to estimating the value added by management.  The paper will conclude 
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Management “Dark Matter” 
Dark matter, in the physics sense, is largely unobservable—albeit critical to 
understanding the physics of the universe. The dark matter of management has also 
been largely unobservable in the outputs of the core processes of an organization, 
although it is also critical to understanding the functioning of an organization.1 These 
mysterious elements are the managing activities that guide the organization toward 
its future and are assumed to be associated with the market outcomes (e.g., 
increases or decreases in revenue, military capability) managers attempt to 
influence.  
Management activities contribute directly to the outputs of the processes that 
are being managed, but they also involve the use of managers’ creative insights 
when they attempt to predict the future, create potential pathways to accomplish the 
predictions, and control for future risks and uncertainties. Those activities that are 
uniquely associated with management involve the creative use of decision heuristics 
based on managers implicit knowledge accumulated over years of experience, 
training and education.  We label this creative aspect as management “dark matter.” 
This management “dark matter” has largely been assumed to be critical to the duties 
of a manager but has not been objectively measured as researchers attempted to 
account for the value added by management.  
These heuristics from management’s dark matter are not algorithmically 
definable and previously have been subsumed within the standard knowledge value 
added (KVA) methodology in gross estimates of the overall output of an organization 
at a given point in time.  Basic KVA theory is designed specifically for all processes, 
activities that are algorithmically definable a priori, i.e., for processes with 
predetermined outputs (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995).  KVA posits an analytic 
tautology that assumes that historical outputs of an organization at a given point in 
time can be described in common units and, therefore, can be counted in absolute 
                                            
1 Notionally, the grey (dark) matter of the brain also is where original thinking occurs. 
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terms. Further, the total revenue of a commercial organization is equivalent to the 
total number of common units of output at a given point in time.  The theory must 
now be expanded to account for those managing activities that involve creative 
attempts to resolve risk, uncertainty and take advantage of upside potential.  
To maintain the historical and analytic context of KVA, we will provide a way 
to count the management dark matter activities within estimates of the overall output 
of the organization at a given point in time. This is reasonable given the fact that 
previous dark matter activities can be found in current process outputs; they usually 
take the form of changes to those process descriptions that lead to new or changed 
outputs.  
For instance, in an open-business-model environment, if an acquisition 
manager suggests that a vendor change some aspect of his/her core processes to 
ensure that a project stay on schedule, and the vendor responds by changing his/her 
process to mitigate the perceived risk, then the acquisition manager’s dark matter 
will eventually be manifested in the changed process. This example assumes that 
the acquisition manager and vendor are part of a virtual organization working 
collaboratively toward a final outcome, e.g., an integrated weapons system.  
In the ARCI (Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion) program, an open architecture 
(OA), open-acquisition business model was used to rapidly transition new 
technologies from the Advanced Submarine Technology Office (ASTO) housed 
within the Program Executive Office-Integrated Weapons Systems (PEO-IWS)  and 
the ARCI program (housed within a different program office, i.e., PEO Subs). This 
created an increase in the complexity of the acquisition cycle. However, it also 
allowed the ARCI program to leverage the resources and outputs of the ASTO 
program when it created an inter-program partnership. The OA, open-business 
model provided the environment that created this opportunity as well as contributed 
to the increased complexity. In this environment, the ARCI acquisition management 
had to use more of its dark matter to ensure closer collaboration among the various 
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parties as well as to predict and mitigate possible uncertainties and risks while 
leveraging the multiple resources of the “virtual” organization. 
Accounting for the value added by acquisition managers, in this case, is more 
than just accounting for their routine process contributions; it also requires 
accounting for their use of dark matter capabilities to influence the future behavior of 
the virtual organization. If the acquisition manager is really “doing his/her job” in this 
open business environment, s/he will constantly be using this dark matter to attempt 
to control risks and uncertainties by predicting the future actions necessary to 
mitigate same.  
This manager can no longer be content to simply ensure that the vendor 
meets the stipulated contract obligations. In the new open environment, the 
acquisitions manager must now coordinate with numerous potential contractors 
throughout the life cycle of the system acquisition. These must become a part of a 
virtual management team that collaborates regularly to ensure that the developing 
(or developed) system meets the needs of the warfighter. This new, more complex 
environment introduces greater opportunities for the manager to use his/her dark 
matter to creatively anticipate and solve problems while also seeking better ways to 
satisfy the constantly changing warfighter requirements. 
Difficult-to-track Dark Matter Outputs 
This dark matter aspect of his/her job has been more difficult to track in 
objective terms and largely has been relegated to anecdotal descriptions of the 
occasional successes and failures in the use of dark matter capabilities.  These 
managers’ job descriptions include directions to use their dark matter capabilities to 
control for risks, such as potentially slipping development and implementation 
schedules.  However, it is often more easy for them to simply focus on the daily 
routines of “putting out fires” than to stretch their dark matter capacities to innovate 
when necessary to mitigate future risks and capitalize on future opportunities—in 
other words, to increase warfighting capabilities.  
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We can use standard KVA methodology to track the outputs of this dark 
matter activity over time since it has been assumed to be a part of the organization’s 
overall output at a given point in time.  As such, it is assumed to be a required part of 
the manager’s standard outputs and, thus, can be counted within the standard KVA 
methodology.  However, we also assume that this dark matter output will have some 
influence on the marketplace. Therefore this output should correlate with changes in 
the market, such as increased sales. 
Computing Metaphor 
Another way to describe management dark matter conceptually is by using a 
computing metaphor as has been used previously to describe the KVA methodology 
(Kanevsky & Housel, 1998). Using a computing analogy, managers use their dark 
matter capabilities to write the program for the processes they manage.  “Writing” 
the program includes: 
 decisions they must make during the course of a given time period, 
including: 
o Deciding which “program” to use 
o Deciding how to allocate resources to produce given outputs 
o Sustaining activities that maintain his/her network 
o Forecasting the amount of outputs desired from the processes 
he/she manages 
o Creating, sending, and receiving messages 
o Selecting and using technology to support management 
activities 
Writing the program is how managers create value in the processes they 
manage. The time it takes to write the program to produce a given output is the cost 
of managing. The actual, non-redundant length of the program is proportionate to 
the value of the program (Housel & Kanevsky, 1995).  More complex dark matter 
decisions require longer programs, and simpler decisions require shorter programs.  
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Writing a relatively long program that includes significant amounts of redundancy 
and does not execute or executes poorly is how managers increase costs—relative 
to managers who write shorter, i.e., more elegant, programs that produce the same 
outputs.  This can be likened to the “art of good management.” 
Technology can support managers in producing their dark matter outputs. For 
example, in an open acquisitions environment, collaborative technology can support 
a manager in recording, distributing, and receiving messages. However, while 
“managing technology” may execute some routine management activities, there is 
no program, at this point, that can write its own unique program.  This makes the 
position of the managers unique because, at this point in time,2 it is their ability to 
create elegant programs that largely determines their success in managing. 
The ability of a manager to write elegant programs that produce the desired 
amount and kinds of process outputs, largely determines his/her value added to the 
enterprise.  If they write programs that predict poorly, managers will fail to allocate 
resources properly and, thus, fail to produce the desired outputs. This will be 
evidenced by overall lower returns on investment (ROIs) on given processes due to 
relatively poor utilization of process assets such as technology and employees. 
Elegant, parsimonious, and precise management “programmers” will produce 
the best outcomes over time. This may be due to a variety of reasons, including: 
employees that are happier because they are more productive, the ability of 
management to respond quickly to changes in markets-environments, and higher 
utilization of technology assets based on more optimized process designs. There 
may be a variety of outcomes due to more elegant programs; however, regardless of 
outcome, elegant programs will result in higher ROIs in managing.  
                                            
2 Ray Kurzweil (In the Age of Spiritual Machines) argues that computers will have the intelligence to 
write their own unique programs within the next 50 years. 
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Dark Matter Correlates with Market Performance 
We recognize that these dark matter activities are meant to influence the 
future behavior of the core processes of organizations to achieve the management 
goals established for the organization. As such, they should be correlated with the 
market performance of the organization in terms of the impact on outcomes obtained 
by organizations (e.g., increased capabilities, winning the battle, more revenue, or 
other forms of value).  
The seeming conundrum is that while these dark matter activities are 
designed to influence future behavior and outcomes, historically, they can be 
accounted for at a given point in time.  That they are part of the output of an 
organization at a given point in time is clear; however, they cannot be tied directly to 
the current outputs of the organization that produce the value or capabilities that 
markets are willing to purchase.  
For example, in our new open business environment in which all parties are 
part of a collaborative virtual organization,  an acquisition manager would feel free to 
suggest a potential risk mitigation strategy to a contractor because he/she assumes 
that the development schedule will slip due to the loss of a key programmer. With 
the required increase in collaboration among the contractor and the other parties 
involved in the development and deployment of a new integrated weapons system 
(IWS), precipitated by the use of an OA and open-business-model approach, 
managers of every group must engage in greater cooperation across organizational 
boundaries. To be successful, they all must use their collective dark matter 
capabilities to recognize and address potential risks and opportunities.  
In this new cooperative environment, whether the acquisition manager’s or 
the contractor’s dark matter activity is directly responsible for changes to IWS 
development processes cannot be known unambiguously—e.g., “Was it the 
acquisition manager or the contractor manager that was responsible for the changed 
process that avoided the possible schedule slippage?” The only thing that is 
unambiguous is that both have produced the outputs from their collective dark 
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matter capabilities, and these should be treated as coming from a single 
management entity. They should, therefore, be less inclined to point fingers when 
things go wrong due to poor use of management dark matter and more inclined to 
ensure that the IWS is delivered on time, with the capabilities required by the 
warfighter.  
In addition, the cooperative use of dark matter to achieve common goals will 
ensure that managers make the adjustments necessary to seize opportunities to 
create greater capabilities in the IWS when deemed necessary by the warfighter. 
Tracking their collective use of dark matter makes it possible to assess the 
contributions of the new collaborative cross-organizational management team. There 
is nothing quite like being measured on overall performance to drive home the need 
for cooperation to achieve common goals. 
Outputs of Dark Matter 
If we assume that these dark matter outputs are a necessary part of the 
output of an organization—and this would appear to be the case in terms of our 
expectations for as least part of what managers should be doing: i.e., predicting the 
future and controlling for risk—then it follows that these dark matter activities of 
management are, a priori, designed to be part of the output of the organization.  
Indeed, a review of management job descriptions would include imperatives to “lead, 
motivate, plan for the future, control risks,” all of which we are labeling dark matter 
activities.  
For example, if a manager uses his/her creative insight to suggest that the 
product should be painted green as well as red, the painting process eventually must 
be changed to reflect the prediction that the new color for the product will sell better 
to a given segment of the market.  
Or, for example, when an acquisition manager senses that the schedule is 
about to slip because a subcontractor has gone bankrupt, he/she must predict the 
effect of this risk and develop strategies to mitigate the problem, such as maintaining 
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an option to purchase the service from another developer.  Another example might 
be when the “manager” (officer) of a warfighting process that tracks ships in a 
congested area, such as the Persian Gulf, recognizes that something is amiss even 
though the track information appears to be correct. His intuition, based on the dark 
matter acquired over years of experience, comes into play in seeking further 
clarification of the track information because something (his intuition, or dark matter) 
tells him all is not well, and this ship may not be “friendly”. 
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Operationalizing: The Measurement of Dark Matter 
We assume that managers constantly acquire knowledge both formally and 
informally, learn from that knowledge, and incorporate that knowledge in their 
decision-making in predicting the future and in planning to control for risk and 
uncertainty from a constantly changing environment. This form of management “dark 
matter” output is manifested largely in the messages that managers generate, 
distribute and interpret to predict and control core processes to accomplish the goals 
of the organization.  Most of a manager’s time is spent in creating, sending, 
receiving and interpreting messages. These messages are basic descriptions of 
actions the manager is influencing his organization to take. Some of these actions 
are unambiguously tied to actual production of the process they are managing and, 
thus, are captured in the standard KVA methodology within the description of 
process outputs.  
The central idea is that we can “see” the manifestation of that acquired 
knowledge and the subsequent managing activities via the networks that managers 
and information technology (e.g., collaborative technology) use to create, send, and 
receive messages. These messages are sent to and received from the employees 
and the technology.3  The actual contents of the messages take many forms and fill 
many purposes—all of which can be described in the common descriptive language 
provided by the KVA approach in terms of their relative complexity.  
The challenge is to develop an operationalization of management dark matter 
outputs that permits an objective bifurcation of relevant and irrelevant activities 
                                            
3 Future research may establish a more refined measure of dark matter activity and outputs by 
examining the networks managers create, modify and use to receive and distribute their messages. 
These networks vary in terms of their complexity; the messages sent and received also vary in 
complexity.  These two forms of complexity can be described in terms of the knowledge required to 
reproduce them, and the knowledge can be described in common units using the KVA approach. 
With this information, we can measure the amount of knowledge transferred through each link in the 
network—including the knowledge used to maintain and modify the network. 
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without resorting to overly subjective interpretations and the potential biases such 
subjective judgments introduce. At the very least, the goal should be to establish an 
unambiguous principle for categorizing relevant and irrelevant activities that is 
defensible without resorting to subjective judgment. This bifurcation will be worked 
out as we attempt to operationalize this approach over time with actual case studies 
and empirical research.4 
Those messages that are unambiguously tied to current process outputs 
represent routine management outputs that are measurable in the standard KVA 
methodology. Those management messages that are not found directly in current 
outputs of the process are evidence of management dark matter activity. Regardless 
of their semantic content, because we can observe all the messages and estimate 
their complexity, they represent a convenient way to observe and measure 
management dark matter outputs.   
Management Dark Matter Outputs and Job Descriptions 
Top executives often state goals in broad sweeping terms such as “We will 
move from product leadership to cost leadership within the next three years; We will 
move from a proprietary, closed business model to an open business model in 
acquisitions.”  Such broadly stated goals must be translated into action at the 
process level through changes in the process descriptions (e.g., make more widgets 
or make different kinds of widgets).   
                                            
4 The basic problem is to determine what aspects of this management dark matter are relevant to 
organizational value and which are not directly relevant.  It is possible to semantically interpret 
management activities as relevant or irrelevant to the organization. For example, when a manager 
arranges a dinner date with his/her spouse, it is very likely this activity was irrelevant to achieving 
organizational goals. However, when we examine less obvious examples, such as a manager musing 
about whether to invest in a new technology that may or may not ever be purchased, it is less obvious 
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Management job descriptions should reflect the dark matter capabilities 
necessary to translate such broad, sweeping goals into operational realities.  One 
way to measure dark matter output would be to examine the job descriptions of 
managers and ask them to estimate how many messages and/or activities they 
generate to fulfill each aspect of the job, as well as how often they do this within a 
given time period. To check the accuracy of manager’s self reports, we can check 
actual message logs, e-mails, other text-based historical records to ensure there is a 
high enough level of reliability among the estimates to proceed. 
It would also be possible to ask them to generate a more precise job 
description if the original is not sufficiently reflective of what they really do.  The next 
step would be to separate the duties that involve routine daily operations and those 
that are more reflective of management dark matter activities.  
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Case Example: Ship Tracking Process 
There are approximately 250K ships at sea world-wide at any given point in 
time. The US military needs to know which are friendly and which are potential foes. 
The responsibility for tracking these ships currently rests with the Coast Guard. The 
tracking process must be managed by experienced Watch Commanders who can 
intuitively sense when a given track is incorrect  (Figure 1). This ability cannot be 
automated at this point in time and is, therefore, indicative of dark matter.  Watch 
Commanders must be able to anticipate when risks of false identification of tracks 
may be present. 










Ship Tracking Management’s Dark Matter Activities 
The track manager and his watch commander must supervise the process to 
ensure that timely and accurate information is provided to various DoD entities to 
help them achieve situational awareness (SA). The primary job of management is to 
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ensure its subordinates are correctly tracking the ship activity. One method by which 
members of management check tracking is the quality control step, in which 
managers must sign off on track reports as accurate. 
In this environment, there are times when the managers intuitively recognize 
that the track information may not be correct—even though they may not be 
completely aware of why they have made such judgments. Their intuitions lead them 
to ask their subordinates to re-run the track information gathering to ensure its 
accuracy.  Their use of dark matter results in communications/messages, to 
subordinates to rerun the tracking process on given suspect targets. As such, the 
communications are observable applications of their dark matter and can be 
described via the standard KVA methodology.  
The times when intuitions are correct or incorrect also can be counted. If we 
take a conservative attribution strategy, we will only count the correct ones, those 
ships that turned out to be incorrectly tracked and categorized, as part of 
management’s dark matter output. However, it can also be argued that to achieve a 
given yield rate for suspected tracks, management must have some level of false 
positives; therefore, all should be counted as management dark matter outputs. In 
either case, this simple case example enabled us to identify and count those dark 
matter outputs of management which in turn allowed us to allocate value to those 
activities.  
In this case example, we have also demonstrated that when a simple dark 
matter capability can be explicitly described (i.e., we may uncover the heuristic 
decision-making process that managers used to identify the potential incorrect 
tracks), it becomes possible to capture this dark matter capability in intelligent 
computer programs such as expert systems. This is the basis for many expert 
systems that embed management dark matter decision capabilities within their code.  
The new tracking system developed by the Office of  Naval Research not only 
automated most of the tracking process but also largely replaced the need for the 
managers to use their dark matter to identify potential incorrect tracks.  The new 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 17- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
system greatly improved the capabilities to track the enormous number of ships that 
previously were tracked primarily by human operators.  It also is capable of 
gathering additional information that makes use of managers’ intuition about 
possible inaccurate tracking largely unnecessary.   
However, the track process designers continue to require the presence of 
management to sign off on the accuracy of tracks while ensuring that the routine 
tracking process is carried out as expected. If management becomes complacent 
about its dark matter duties, it may assume that the new system is so accurate that 
management members need not waste their time trying to find the potentially 
inaccurate tracks.   
Because dark matter activities involve prediction, the possible removal of this 
management dark matter capability must be considered seriously because one 
correct prediction—i.e., identification of an inaccurate track by management that was 
not caught by the new system—might lead to identification of a suspect ship that is 
carrying weapons of mass destruction. Dismissing management prerogatives 
embedded in its dark matter capabilities by “automating” them must be carefully 
considered before leadership eliminates this capability. 
Standard KVA and Delta Correlation Approaches 
The cascading of management goals to lower levels of management, and 
eventually to the process level, represents the relative influence of managers on 
their organizations. This kind of influence takes time to become a reality at the 
process level.  Because the response of the market to these kinds of goal-setting 
messages is uncertain, it is necessary to measure the change or delta in value (e.g., 
capabilities, revenue) of the organization over time as the goals eventually become, 
or fail to become, reality in process changes.   
We must acknowledge the likelihood that these kinds of unique management 
activities do indeed influence organizational outcomes—as has been argued in prior 
research as well as in general business publications about the role and value of 
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leadership and management.  This assumption leads us to propose that changes in 
these activities should be roughly correlated with changes in market outcomes.   
Because making a causal, one-to-one connection between dark matter 
messages and changes in core processes is problematic due to the semantic-
interpretation problems mentioned earlier, we will not attempt to causally connect the 
two. Because a pure historical causal relationship cannot be established between 
the dark matter-market outcome-process change deltas, we will need to track the 
correlation among the three over time to better understand the relationship between 
deltas in management dark matter activity and the presumed corresponding deltas in 
market responses.   
This logic leads to two measures of management dark matter activity. First, 
we can track the deltas in management’s dark matter activity, process changes, and 
market outcomes over time. Second, using standard KVA methodology, we can 
account for the amount of dark matter outputs as a percentage of the total outputs of 
a process and, consequently, of the organization at a given historical point in time.5  
As a first cut, we can aggregate the delta of all managers’ dark matter activity 
and correlate it with market outcome deltas.  Individual manager dark matter output 
deltas can be compared within the organization and correlated with the market 
outcome deltas to infer which managers have had the most influence on market 
outcomes.  This approach extends standard KVA theory to the largely uncharted 
realm of how management influences organizational outcomes.  
 
                                            
5 In the first case, we can use standard KVA methodology to allocate outputs and associated value 
(e.g., revenue, capability) to individual managers at a given point in time. In the second case, we can 
measure the relative changes in deltas among the managers’ dark matter activity and the 
corresponding changes in market deltas.   
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Basic Hypothesis  
This formulation of the problem enables us to test some basic hypotheses 
about the correlation among dark matter outputs and organizational outcomes. One 
hypothesis would be that there should be a much higher percentage of dark matter 
outputs in an open business environment (in which the OA approach is used to 
develop IWS systems) compared to a closed business model approach (in which 
proprietary IWS systems are developed).  
Similarly, in the corporate sector, the amount of management dark matter 
produced over a given period of time should correlate with the amount of revenue 
generated over a period of time. It should follow that mature industries (e.g., 
petroleum extraction) that have largely mitigated risks and operate within a relatively 
stable environment in which demand is largely predictable should have less of this 
kind of dark matter than those operating within largely unstable environments (e.g., 
biotechnology).   
The same would pertain to military environments in which there have been 
periods of stable competition (e.g., Cold War) among nations compared to periods 
when competition among entities is ill-defined and highly volatile (e.g., Global War 
on Terror). In the current, military environment in which there is greater instability, 
there is a larger need for the production of management dark matter to predict and 
deal with uncertainties and risks.  
Hypothesis Test: ARCI versus Proprietary Acquisition 
The ARCI case example provides a simplistic test of this hypothesis. We can 
compare the rough orders of magnitude estimates of dark matter outputs in both 
proprietary and open environments and then correlate these with the outcomes for 
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development of IWS systems in both environments.6  The hypothesis is that the OA, 
open-business-model environment of ARCI generated significantly more dark matter 
output than the proprietary model of system acquisition in IWS. 
The hypothesis rests on the basic assumption that when managers are 
successful in setting and implementing goals to affect the markets within which they 
operate, markets respond positively and the converse is also true.   
Through changes that they induce in their organization’s core processes, the 
commercial market responds by purchasing more of their products, the same 
number of higher priced products, or both outcomes. In the military “markets,” 
managers/officers use their dark matter to anticipate future actions by adversaries by 
adding capabilities and improving system acquisition cycle-times to respond to new 
events and competitor’s strategies.  
However, when managers increase these kinds of creative activities and the 
result is lower revenue or reduced capabilities, it can be said that management 
reduced or failed to increase value. The delta in dark matter management activities 
from one period to the next, in response to anticipated changes in the market, 
should correlate to organizational performance over time. 
It does not follow, however, that merely increasing the number of dark matter 
activities (e.g., setting goals, trying to implement an increased number of goals) will 
result in increases in value. These goals and other creative management activities 
must eventually be translated into operational changes in core processes to affect 
any changes in company outputs and, therefore, responses to changes in the 
market. Such inevitability provides a rationale for counting management dark matter 
activities within counts of the total output of an organization at any given point in 
                                            
6 It does not permit, however, the translation of deltas in dark matter activity over time into absolute 
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time.7  Clearly, these activities are present and can be described with the standard 
KVA approach currently used to describe the outputs of all processes in common 
units. It follows that the standard KVA approach may be extended to triangulate with 
the correlational approach in estimating the effect of dark matter outputs on 
organizational outcomes.  
ROI on Management Dark Matter 
Using the KVA knowledge metaphor to describe outputs, the absolute total 
contribution of managing a process is equivalent to the total amount of knowledge 
required to produce and interpret all management messages during a given time 
period.  The amount of time a manager (and supporting management technology) 
spends using this knowledge is the cost of management.  It follows that a manager 
who must use a large amount of knowledge to process messages but can process 
those messages quickly, provides a relatively good return on investment in 
managing.  Those who take longer to produce a similarly complex output cost more 
and provide a lower relative return on investment. 
We would need to make a further separation of messages that involve use of 
dark matter from those that do not. Following this separation, we would estimate the 
amount of complexity in each message set using the learning time or other KVA 
approach, and estimate the total amount of output from the dark matter activity (i.e., 
the prediction-based messages). This resulting value would be included in the total 
output for a given period, and value would be allocated proportionately as is done 
currently in the KVA method for normal process outputs. 
                                            
7 A very crude and simple test of this hypothesis would be to compare the dark matter job activities of 
the acquiring manager in a proprietary environment with the dark matter job activities of managers in 
an OA, open-management environment. The number of messages and complexity of messages used 
to coordinate acquisition in an OA, open-business-models environment would be much greater than 
for managers in the proprietary, single-vendor context.  This would assume that the processes 
managed have about the same level of complexity. Relative complexity of the process becomes the 
index against which the amount of dark matter per unit of complexity is produced.  
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We can use standard KVA methodology to allocate outputs and associated 
value (e.g., revenue, capability) to individual managers at a given point in time.  
 Resolving uncertainty requires that managers make a prediction about what 
demands the future will make on current processes in terms of the amount and kinds 
of outputs required from those processes. These messages, interpretations of 
messages, and decisions about resolving risk and uncertainty can be observed over 
time such that it is possible to gather historical data on the number and amount of 
complexity of these dark matter managing activities.8   
So, in addition to the routine KVA data that estimates the number of common 
units of output from algorithmically definable processes, it also is possible to count 
the number of dark matter outputs and their respective complexity. The total amount 
of output, then, is a function of the number of times a given asset produces 
algorithmically defined outputs multiplied times the amount of complexity required to 
produce the outputs plus the dark matter outputs that occur in that given time 
period.9 
Past research on the value of management and leadership provides a useful 
review of alternative approaches to this daunting problem. There are a number of 
lines of research that have attempted to address this problem indirectly and may 
offer some insights about its many varied aspects. Thus, it would be useful to review 
the strengths and weaknesses of these prior attempts to resolve this difficult 
problem. 
                                            
8 This formulation assumes that we do not count redundancy in the dark matter activities—such as 
exhorting the vendor to “work harder” every day during the observational time period. We would count 
the non-redundant or unique dark matter outputs. In this case, we might only count the exhortation to 
work harder as one output instead of one output repeated many times.  We would also separate out 
the non-relevant activities—for example, when the manager calls his wife to arrange a dinner date. 
9 Given that there are many, if not infinite, alternative paths for the organization’s future, it is 
impossible to enumerate all the potential opportunities foregone by selecting a specific path. It is, 
therefore, not useful (in accounting for dark matter outputs) to attempt to look backward to determine 
whether managers might have better utilized their dark matter to make “better” predictions. This type 
of interpretation must be left to the subjective judgment of the leadership of the organization. 
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Prior Approaches to Assessing the Value of 
Management  
The literature on the value added by managing includes the effect of 
corporate governance on firm value, the drivers of value (including managing 
activities), the characteristics of great leaders, failures of management, and fund 
management.  
This review of previous attempts to assess the value that management adds 
includes research on: 
 How corporate governance affects a firm’s valuation, 
 What management characteristics can lead to improved company 
value, 
 Fund-management approaches to solving the problem, and 
 Attempts to solve the management value added quantification problem 
using a knowledge framework. 
Corporate Management/Governance Value  
The current literature discussing the effect of corporate governance on 
management valuation does not focus on direct valuation of individual managers or 
those in positions to perform management governance activities. Instead, the current 
literature revolves around two major themes: an analysis of corporate governance 
and its relation to firm value as well as an analysis of corporate management 
techniques and suggestions on qualitatively increasing management’s value. 
Literature focused on corporate governance/management focuses on two 
major themes: addressing whether corporate governance affects firm value and 
providing suggestions on how to qualitatively increase the value of corporate 
governance/management—thus, increasing firm value.  Literature focused on the 
second theme generally does not relate techniques directly to quantitatively 
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measured increases in firm value, but instead implies that the techniques will 
increase value in some way. 
Corporate Governance and its Effect on Firm Value 
Black, Jang, and Kim set out to answer the question: “How do a country’s 
corporate governance rules, or the corporate governance practices of individual 
firms within a country, affect overall firm value and performance?” (Black, Jang, & 
Kim, 2003, p. 1).   This study answers the question by developing a corporate 
governance index for 526 Korean public companies.  The index is based on 
information obtained on shareholder rights, board of directors in general, outside 
directors, audit committee and internal auditor disclosure to investors, and 
ownership parity.  It then uses multiple regression equations to explain the variance 
in the corporate governance index compared to firm value.  The analysis finds 
evidence that corporate governance is an important factor in explaining the market 
value of Korean public companies.  Following a similar model Beiner, Drobetz, 
Schmid, and Zimmerman (2006) establish a relationship between corporate 
governance quality and firm value.   
Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmerman, in their work “An Integrated 
Framework of Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation,” state that:  
Recent empirical research shows evidence of a positive relationship 
between the quality of firm-specific corporate governance and firm 
valuation. Instead of looking at one single corporate governance 
mechanism in isolation, [this report] constructs a broad corporate 
governance index and [applies] five additional variables related to 
ownership structure, board characteristics, and leverage to provide a 
comprehensive description of firm-level corporate governance for a 
representative sample of Swiss firms. To control for potential 
endogeneity of these six governance mechanisms, [the report 
develops] a system of simultaneous equations and [applies] three-
stage least squares (3SLS). [The] results support the widespread 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between corporate governance 
and firm valuation. (2006, publication abstract) 
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This work shows a relationship between the quality of specific corporate 
governance practices and the value of a firm, but does not allow for direct valuation 
of individual managers.  It primarily supplements the intuitive hypothesis that quality 
affects value.     
Klein, Shapiro, and Young (2005) prove a similar relationship between quality 
and value in Canadian firms, but add the additional element of the ownership 
category.  In their report, the researchers analyze the relationship between firm 
value and indices of effective corporate governance in Canadian firms.  “The results 
indicate that corporate governance does matter in Canada. However, not all 
elements of measured governance are important, and the effects of governance do 
differ by ownership category” (Klein, Shapiro, & Young, 2005, publication abstract). 
The results of this study establish the link between quality of governance and value. 
An additional work with similar results is Hsiu-I Ting’s (2006).  In this work, 
Ting investigates the 207 IPO companies encompassing the Taiwan Security 
Exchange between the years 1992-2002.  His analysis examines situations in which 
corporate governance could increase firm value. 
[Ting] finds positive effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance, which proves the existence of a corporate governance 
effect. Different from the previous studies, this paper addresses the 
fact that the corporate governance effect exists under poor economic 
conditions. As expected, firms with poor corporate governance 
mechanisms tend to perform badly when business cycles go 
downward. In other words, the report indicates the importance of 
corporate governance increases during poor economic conditions. 
Firms with higher agency costs also show a significant corporate 
governance effect.  [Also, when investing more in other companies 
causes a firm structure to become more complicated while 
simultaneously diminishing information disclosure, the corporate 
governance mechanism could work effectively.] Finally, the recognition 
of a supervisor is an important factor for corporate governance effect 
as well. Firms with executive recognition appear to have a corporate 
governance effect. (2006, p. 8) 
To summarize, this line of research demonstrated that there is a relationship 
between corporate governance firm values, but there is a profound gap in 
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quantifying the precise value of the management that governs companies.  
Furthermore, once the management/government structure is broken down and one 
wishes to determine the value of specific managers, the lack of quantifiable value 
studies becomes even more accentuated.  There is a lack of studies that attempt to 
measure the value of management in dollar terms.  
Another theme of corporate management valuation studies involves 
discussing the methods of increasing the value of corporate management.  
Unfortunately for our purposes, this literature fails to produce objective measures of 
how much value managers add. 
Increasing the Value of Corporate Management 
There are many works discussing techniques to improve management 
techniques, and most offer useful insights to do so.  However, these techniques are 
limited because there is no quantifiable measure to discover how they increase firm 
value.   
All agree that more effective management is ideal, but seem to question how 
one can discover what management characteristics and techniques are the most 
effective without discovering the relative value they add.  How can managers 
discover what they should place emphasis on without knowing the payoff?  The 
following works all discuss valuable techniques crucial to manager success, but 
none supplement their advice with techniques to discover their actual value added. 
In their book, Value Driven Management: How to Create and Maximize Value 
over Time for Organizational Success, Pohlman and Gardiner discuss how to 
increase management’s value by focusing on eight “value drivers”: external cultural 
values, internal cultural values, employee values, supplier values, customer values, 
third-party values, competitor values, and owner values.  This guideline is structured 
to help managers keep pace with fluctuating business structures in order to achieve 
long-term success.  Pohlman and Gardiner’s book is about leading, managing and 
working in organizations as managers enter the twenty-first century.  Its techniques 
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are rooted in traditional theories and styles, but focus on value creation over time—
because traditional theories must constantly make adjustments as paradigms shift.  
Following in the same spirit is Michael Armstrong’s A Handbook of 
Management Techniques Revised, 3rd edition.  Armstrong’s work acts as a guide for 
professional managers or as an essential guide for students.  His work attempts to 
encompass value-adding skills/techniques for numerous management 
responsibilities.  It distinguishes between tasks that fall into the following categories: 
marketing management, operational management, financial management, human 
resource management, management science, planning and resource allocation, 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Within these topics, Armstrong’s work includes 100 
qualitative, systematic, and analytical methods used to assist in decision-making and 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness.  As is evident, Pohlman and Gardiner as 
well as Armstrong focus on techniques that increase management’s value.   
Gardner’s work described below takes a slight shift in topic from suggesting useful 
techniques to highlighting character traits that are inherent in a successful leader.  
John Gardner’s On Leadership (1990) focuses on the characteristics a leader 
should possess, centering on managers and how such qualities increase their value 
to their business.  Gardner lists six respects with which leader/managers distinguish 
themselves from the general run of managers: 
• They think longer-term—beyond the day’s crises, beyond the quarterly 
report, beyond the horizon. 
• In thinking about the unit they are heading, they grasp its relationship 
to larger realities—the larger organization of which they are a part, 
conditions external to the organization, global trends. 
• They reach and influence constituents beyond their jurisdictions, 
beyond boundaries. 
• They put heavy emphasis on the intangibles of vision, values, and 
motivation and understand intuitively the nonrational and unconscious 
elements in leader-constituent interaction. 
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• They have the political skill to cope with the conflicting requirements of 
multiple constituencies. 
• They think in terms of renewal.  The routine manager tends to accept 
organizational structure and process as it exists.  The leader or 
leader/manager seeks the revisions of process and structure required 
by ever-changing reality.   
Management characteristics are obviously important to company success.  
Therefore, it clearly follows that company failure can result from choosing a manager 
that lacks the characteristics necessary for success.  Gerard Egan, in Adding Value: 
A Systematic Guide to Business-driven Management and Leadership, cites this as 
one of the main reasons for organizational failure.  He provides information on 
choosing the correct manager.    
When companies fail, Egan proposes that true failure lies not with managers 
themselves, but with the system by which they are chosen and developed. Egan 
states that it is not wise to promote professionals to management without any 
guidance on how to actually manage; they may excel in a specific skills area, such 
as engineering or accounting, but may lack the specific management training 
necessary to be good managers. Egan describes the basic skills managers need to 
look beyond their own area of expertise in ways that add value to the business. He 
presents a comprehensive, integrated system of management that can be adapted 
to meet any company's real business needs—including strategy, leadership, 
structure, human resources, innovation, and organizational culture. Egan offers 
theoretical constructs as well as three practical, hands-on models. Most importantly, 
he shows how to integrate the models into a system that managers can use to 
identify, organize, and implement the best ideas emerging from today's "business 
and organizational potential" movement.  
All the techniques on management characteristics discussed in countless 
books may be useful, but they do not address the issue of how much value such 
techniques and characteristics can add in specific instances with specific managers.   
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The Alpha measure in fund management attempts to grasp some idea of the 
value of management in general, but also has several limitations that make it 
problematic for use in determining the value added of individual managers.   
Lessons from Fund Management Research 
“Alpha” measures the difference between a fund's actual returns and its 
expected performance given its level of risk (as measured by “beta”). A positive 
alpha figure indicates the fund has performed better than its beta (risk) would 
predict. In contrast, a negative alpha indicates a fund has underperformed, given the 
expectations established by the fund's beta. Some investors see alpha as a 
measurement of the value added or subtracted by a fund's manager. There are 
limitations to alpha's ability to accurately depict a manager's added or subtracted 
value. In some cases, a negative alpha can result from the expenses that are 
present in the fund figures but are not present in the figures of the comparison index. 
In addition, alpha is dependent on the accuracy of beta: If the investor accepts beta 
as a conclusive definition of risk, a positive alpha would be a conclusive indicator of 
good fund performance. Of course, the value of beta is dependent on R-squared.  
For Alpha vs. the Standard Index, Morningstar performs its calculations using 
the S&P 500 as the benchmark index for equity funds and the Lehman Brothers 
Aggregate as the benchmark index for bond funds. Morningstar deducts the current 
return of the 90-day T-bill from the total return of both the fund and the benchmark 
index. The difference is called the fund's excess return. The exact mathematical 
definition of alpha that Morningstar uses is listed below.  
Alpha = Excess Return - ((Beta x (Benchmark - Treasury))  
Benchmark = Total Return of Benchmark Index  
Treasury = Return on Three-month Treasury Bill (Morningstar). 
Aside from Alpha, there have been several previous attempts to quantify the 
contributions of management, but they have, as yet, failed to provide a means to 
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quantify the actual value added by individual managers. More recent approaches 
have employed a knowledge-based metaphor to frame the problem.  
Knowledge-based Approaches 
Housel and Nelson (2005) attempted to quantify the contributions of 
management in aggregate using a knowledge-based framework. The general idea of 
their study was that by quantifying management’s total accumulated education, 
experience, and time with a firm, it was possible to generate its weighting on the 
output of a firm.  
The limitations of this approach were that it did not provide a means to 
quantify individual managers’ contributions; it assumed that management’s 
aggregated contributions were purely a result of its members’ combined education, 
experience, and time with the firm, and such weightings were applied as a constant 
across core areas or processes of a firm. While useful as a first attempt to quantify 
the value added by management in aggregate, the general approach assumed away 
individual differences among managers in terms of the value they add to a firm; 
likewise, the weighting factor could not be directly tied to the outputs of a firm in a 
relatively unambiguous way.  
Further, it would be quite possible for two firms to have nearly the same 
weighting factor for management with radically different profitability and productivity 
scores.  A more precise methodology that can differentiate among individual 
managers based on their observable contributions to process outputs would resolve 
these problems.  
Pavlou, Housel, Rodgers, and Jansen’s (2005) research had implications for 
the potential value added by managing activities. They assumed that implicit 
knowledge, which is akin to the notion of the type of knowledge managers use in 
making creative decisions (i.e., dark matter outputs), could be accounted for in terms 
of the experience of employees (including line managers).  As such, a simple 
algorithm to measure their years of experience would serve as an indicator of the 
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amount of knowledge used to produce the outputs of creative problem solving.  
However, this study did not directly address the issue of the value added directly by 
creative managing (i.e., management dark matter) activities. 
There is a substantial collection of literature regarding corporate governance, 
leadership characteristics, and fund management, among other things, which 
attempts to address directly or indirectly the issue of how to measure the value 
added by managing activities. Yet, there remains a lack of research that attempts to 
objectively quantify the value added by individual managers. Further, past 
approaches do not provide a way of structuring the problem such that this kind of 
objective measure can be derived and revenue or value can be allocated to 
individual manager’s dark matter outputs.    
This research gap is further accentuated by the current concerns over the 
transparency of corporate activity, which assists investors in making more informed 
decisions. Transparency would aid investors in understanding the rationale for 
compensation packages provided corporate executives. This call for transparency is 
particularly important for businesses in the United States, but likely applies to the 
rest of the business world as well.   
The research reviewed leads to a common conclusion: firm governance, 
leadership characteristics, management knowledge and experience do affect firm 
valuation. Because firm valuation is ultimately a result of a firm’s profitability or 
productivity over time, there is a direct relationship between firm valuation and 
profitability or productivity over time. The question remaining is, “How much do dark 
matter managing activities affect firm profitability?” 
The prior research also provides qualitative recommendations for how 
individual managers can increase their potential value to the firm.  However, there is 
no relatively objective quantifiable evidence available to tie given characteristics of 
great leaders directly to the actual profitability or productivity of a firm.   
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While promising, the Alpha measure (the term sometimes used as the 
measurement of value a manager contributes to a fund), is a theoretical measure, is 
difficult to estimate, and is seldom reliable because it is very difficult to 
operationalize.  Given that there does not appear to be a relatively objective way to 
quantify the value added by individual managers, such a measure would be 
beneficial to both managers and investors alike. 
An approach to estimating how much value managers add to an organization 
or fund would provide the kinds of performance data that might be used to reward 
value-adding managers while not rewarding those that perform poorly. This 
presumably happens today with existing performance-evaluation techniques. But 
often, these techniques appear very subjective. A more objective technique that ties 
performance directly to the firm’s profitability/productivity, indicating how much of a 
firm’s revenue can be allocated to given managers’ activities, would provide a more 
convincing evaluation.  
The same performance information might lead poorly performing managers to 
self-organize in a way that ensures they are in positions where their talents can be 
used in the most profitable, productive ways. Such measurement would also provide 
investors with the kind of performance data that would lead them to reward 
organizations in which value added by management benchmarks well within an 
industry segment while withdrawing support for firms in which management does not 
perform well.   
The same phenomena should occur in non-profit organizations as well when 
relative productivity among organizations can be compared on an objective basis. 
The federal government with its stop-light (Red=poor performance, Yellow=needs-
improvement performance, and Green=good performance) scorecard for the large 
federal agencies is attempting to accomplish this goal. However, these rather crude 
indicators do not allow for the objective quantification of agency productivity, let 
alone the performance of agency management.  
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What is needed is a method that provides a way to quantify individual 
managers’ contributions using structural, analytic, and relatively objective techniques 
that would allow comparisons among organizations. The method we proposed 
above promises to meet these criteria and will allow allocation of revenue to 
managing activities. This extension of the KVA framework allows the description of 
managing activities in common units.  In addition, because managers produce, 
interpret and send messages through their networks, the method also accounts for 
these managing activities in a common descriptive language.   
Options and Dark Matter 
Many management decisions are constrained by legal or regulatory 
frameworks that severely reduce or virtually eliminate management’s ability to 
examine alternative future pathways or options. If there are no options for managers 
to generate and from which to select, there is no purpose for dark matter activities.  
However, where options exist, managers can take full advantage of their dark 
matter capabilities to help move the organization toward desired future states. The 
introduction of open business acquisition models using an OA system development 
framework promise to create more options for managers to achieve their objectives. 
To succeed in this new environment, managers will have to make more use of their 
dark matter to produce the kinds of outputs that truly serve their warfighting 
customers. Acquisition managers should be more free and motivated to use their 
dark matter capabilities to mitigate potential risks while taking advantage of upside 
opportunities to build better systems that will meet warfighters’ changing 
requirements as they face a more uncertain environment. 
On the other hand, if acquisition managers follow management practices that 
lead to proprietary, non-collaborative solutions, their number of options (and, thus, 
the requirement for the use of their dark matter) are reduced. This, in turn, could 
lead to a reduction in warfighting capability compared to situations in which OA and 
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open business models are employed, in which management dark matter can be 
more easily utilized by acquisitions management.   
Framing these options using the real options analysis method is one way to 
structure managers analysis that also takes advantage of KVA data.  This technique 
has the potential to provide managers a way to achieve more consistent results or 
organizational outcomes over time.  Such techniques as real options and KVA can 
support managers in producing more informed dark matter outputs that will lead to 
better outcomes over time.   
Benefits of Measuring the Value Added of Management 
This method for measuring the performance of managing activities provides a 
variety of new kinds of information for executives, investors, and managers. These 
include: 
 a method to test the value of different management techniques 
(including those advocated in prior research) 
 information that investors could use to determine the performance of 
managers  
 new ways to determine a salary or reward system based on managers’ 
verifiable contributions 
 a basic return on management (ROM) measure at any level of 
aggregation in an organization 
 performance feedback to motivate managers to best utilize their 
individual talents/strengths 
This new information would allow Adam Smith’s invisible hand of the 
competitive market place to manifest itself in determining manager rewards and 
would allow managers to concentrate on techniques that are proven to increase their 
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Appendix A. Future Research—The Delta Problem 
The ultimate goal of the approach is to allocate some amount revenue to 
amount of management dark matter of outputs. This will become more likely when 
we have the derivative (coefficient) necessary to convert the dark matter 
correlational deltas to absolute numbers.  The delta will be proportional to revenue 
with a given coefficient (that is yet to be discovered), once the coefficient is 
established. 
Example of the problem: 
Al Smith, manager of X process, generated 1Gigabyte of (relevant) dark 
matter based messages during January.  In February, he generated 2 Gigabytes of 
dark matter messages. In March, he generated .5 Gigabytes of dark messages. In 
January, the company made $100 in revenue, in February it made $400 in revenue, 
and in March it made $200 in revenue. Correlating Al’s amount of dark matter 
messages per month with revenue per month we establish a relatively negative 
correlation between the two values. We can then check the volatility of the 
company’s revenue performance and Al’s dark matter messages over the same 3 
months and correlate these volatilities. Now we have 2 correlations: between 
revenue and Al’s amount of dark matter messages and between volatility of revenue 
and volatility of Al’s amount of messages per month.  The correlation coefficient 
between the two would allow us to eliminate the dark messages that are not related 
to the revenue.  We would then be able to predict the manager’s activities based on 
changes in revenue or vice versa.   
We need to establish the percentage of relevant (i.e., dark matter based) to 
irrelevant manager messages for every time period in terms of dark matter outputs. 
The volume of irrelevant messages should be independent of the prior time period. 
The amount of irrelevant messages is independent from revenue; the correlation of 
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corporate outcomes. The correlation between relevant and irrelevant messages also 
should be very low.  
These basic conditions can be tested in empirical research. The results of the 
research should help us establish the coefficient that will allow us to translate 
correlational deltas into absolute numbers so that revenue can then be allocated to 
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Appendix B. Correlating the Delta in Value and 
Management Dark Matter Activity  
Once the problems of establishing a method of bifurcating relevant and 
irrelevant dark matter messages has been resolved, it will be necessary to provide 
the method for relating changes in dark matter activity with changes in value (e.g., 
revenue, capability).  To do this, we would have to establish a baseline dark matter 
measure for each manager against which to calculate the rolling averages to 
generate the delta estimates.  The corresponding time periods deltas would also be 
calculated to enable the correlations. Over time with a large sample size, it will be 
possible to estimate the optimal number of dark matter messages for a given level of 
environmental, market uncertainty.  
Assumptions and Algorithms 
In what follows, we lay out the basic algorithmic framework and assumptions 
for estimating the correlation between the management dark matter delta and value 
(e.g., revenue, capability) delta.10  This approach will assume a conservative 
semantic interpretation that would permit estimation of amount of dark matter 
outputs in common units. The following algorithms are a preliminary attempt to 
describe the delta correlation approach. 
The basic equation that accounts for all of the outputs of an organization at a 
given point in time is: 
N (i.e., number of firings of a process, activity) x A (i.e., amount of complexity 
for one firing) +  M (i.e., relevant dark matter management activity). Stated 
more simply: 
N x A + M = Total Value (T) 
                                            
10 The approach is incomplete at this juncture because we do not have the coefficient that would allow 
us to derive an absolute number (i.e., in common units of output) that would lead to allocation of value 
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To measure the change in this equation from time period 1 to time 2, it is 
possible to compute the total value produced in T1 and subtract that from the total 
outputs in T2 in the following equation:  
Total value time period (T1) = N¹ x A¹+ M¹ 
Total value time period (T2) = N² x A² + M² 
The delta for value over the two time periods can be stated as: 
(N1 – N2) x  A + (M1 – M2) =  delta in value resulting from dark management 
activities. 
   N²  - N¹             (M²- M¹)     corresponds to → R²  - R¹ 
 A¹    (N² - N¹)     x   A  +   (N² - N¹)      corresponds to   → N²  - N¹      
             (M4  - M3) →   (R4  - R3) 
 A   +     (N4  - N3)  →   (N4  - N3) 
 M  - M³  ___ M² – M¹ → (R  - R³)  __ R²  - R¹ 
              N  - N³         N²  - N¹→  (N  - N³)       N²  - N¹ 
The degree of change from one period to the next resulting from this dark 
management activity should correspond to the change in value (e.g., revenue, 
capability) from the same two time periods. This equation can be stated as follows 
(where V = revenue or capability): 
A1 (N2 – N1) / (N1 – N2)  x A + (M2 – M1) / (N2 – N1) →  (V2 – V1) / (N1 – N2 )   
The above formulation assumes that we have separated out irrelevant 
messages from M and that M represents relevant messages. It also assumes that 
management messages that can be found in the outputs of current processes are 
algorithmically definable and, therefore, accounted for using the routine KVA 
methodology.  This formulation assumes that redundant messages have been 
eliminated to prevent over-estimation of M.  This formulation also assumes that it is 
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Appendix C. Observations about Over-estimates of 
Dark Matter 
Our formulation of the effect of management dark matter activities on 
organizational value can lead to some interesting observations about managers who 
generate dark matter activities that may not contribute to organization value. For 
example, when the change in value is 0, the corresponding change in M should also 
be 0.  Managers whose generation of dark matter messages do not correlate with 
organizational performance may be creating a lot of “churn” but little value. Given a 
large number of time periods, the manager whose dark matter messages do not 
correlate with organizational performance would be seen as one who was not 
providing unique management contributions that had an impact on organization’s 
value-generating capabilities. 
This formulation does not reward redundancy in management dark matter 
messages. For example, the manager who issues the command, “Work Harder!” 
everyday for a given time period would only get credit for one message because the 
following “Work Harder!” messages would be redundant with the first. Only new and 
unique messages would be counted in the total M for this given manager.  
This formulation also would lead to the conclusion that management dark 
matter would have little influence on organizational value generation when the 
organization was operating in a very stable environment with little risk or uncertainty. 
There should be a corresponding increase in management dark matter activity when 
an organization encounters turbulence, risk, and even higher opportunities for 
increased value. It follows that the complexity of a management environment 
increases in correspondence with increases in environmental uncertainty or risk, and 
the amount of dark matter messages should also increase correspondingly in 
response.  For example, instructing an employee to “paint the door green” in routine 
operations is much less complex than trying to predict how the market will respond 
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instructions to move supplies from point A to point B in peace-time would be less 
complex than in war-time, when there are increasing risks and uncertainties that 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 43- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Initial Distribution List 
1. Defense Technical Information Center       2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944; Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013        2 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5100 
3. Research Office, Code 09          1 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5138 
4. Robert N. Beck             1 
Dean, GSBPP 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
5. Keith F. Snider             1 
Associate Professor, GB 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
6. James B. Greene             1 
Acquisition Chair, GB 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
7. Bill Gates              1 
Associate Dean for Research, GB 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. Dr. Thomas J. Housel           1 
Professor, GSOIS 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
9. Dr. Valery Kanevsky            1 
Research Professor, GSOIS 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
 
10. Karey L. Shaffer             1 
Program Manager, Acquisition Research Program, GB 
555 Dyer Road, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
 
 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2003 - 2006 Sponsored Acquisition Research 
Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Managing Services Supply Chain 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 Spiral Development 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
Contract Management 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 Contractors in 21st Century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting Planning and Execution 
Financial Management 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Capital Budgeting for DoD 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Acquisitions via leasing: MPS case 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
Logistics Management 
 R-TOC Aegis Microwave Power Tubes 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 Army LOG MOD 
 PBL (4) 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 RFID (4) 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Optimizing CIWS Life Cycle Support (LCS) 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to Aegis and SSDS 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research within the Acquisition 
Research Program are available on our website: www.acquisitionresearch.org    
 
 
 
  
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
